We consider the well-studied Hospital Residents (HR) problem in the presence of lower quotas (LQ). The input instance consists of a bipartite graph G = (R∪H, E) where R and H denote sets of residents and hospitals respectively. Every vertex has a preference list that imposes a strict ordering on its neighbors. In addition, each hospital h has an associated upper-quota q + (h) and lower-quota q − (h). A matching M in G is an assignment of residents to hospitals, and M is said to be feasible if every resident is assigned to at most one hospital and a hospital h is assigned at least q − (h) and at most q + (h) residents.
Introduction
In this paper we consider the Hospital Residents problem in the presence of Lower Quotas (HRLQ). The input to our problem is a bipartite graph G = (R∪H, E) where R denotes the set of residents, and H denotes the set of hospitals. Every resident as well as hospital has a non-empty preference ordering over a subset of elements of the other set. Every hospital h ∈ H has a non-zero upper-quota q + (h) denoting the maximum number of residents that can be assigned to h. In addition, every hospital h also has a non-negative lower-quota q − (h) denoting the minimum number of residents that have to be assigned to h. The goal is to assign residents to hospitals such that the upper and lower quotas of all the hospitals are respected (that is, it is feasible) as well as the assignment is optimal with respect to the preferences of the participants.
1.
Computing a maximum cardinality matching popular in the set of feasible matchings.
We give an O(|R|(|E| + |H|)) time algorithm for this problem.
2.
Computing a popular matching amongst maximum cardinality feasible matchings. We give an O(|R| 2 (|E| + |H|)) time algorithm for this problem.
Our algorithms are based on ideas introduced in earlier works on stable marriage (SM) and HR problems [11, 3, 14] . However, in SM and HR problem, a popular matching is guaranteed to exist because a stable matching always exists and it is also popular. On the other hand, in the HRLQ setting even a stable matching may not exist. Yet, we prove that a feasible matching that is popular amongst all feasible matchings always exists and is efficiently computable. We believe that this is not only surprising but also a useful result in practical scenarios. Moreover, our notion of popularity subsumes the notions proposed in [3] and [14] and is more general than both. In [3] , popularity is proved using linear programming, but our proofs for popularity are combinatorial. Overview of the algorithm: Our algorithms are reductions, that is, given an HRLQ instance G, both our algorithms construct instances G and G of the HR problem such that there is a natural way to map a stable matching in G (respectively, G ) to a feasible matching in G. Moreover, any stable matching in G (G ) gets mapped to a maximum cardinality matching that is popular amongst all the feasible matchings in G (respectively, a matching that is popular amongst all maximum cardinality matchings in G).
Organization of the paper:
We define the notion of popularity in Section 2. The reduction for computing a maximum cardinality popular matching amongst feasible matchings is given in Section 3 and its correctness is proved in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 describes the reduction for computing a matching that is popular amongst maximum cardinality feasible matchings and its correctness. Related work: The notion of popularity was first proposed by Gärdenfors [7] in the stablemarriage (SM) setting, where each vertex has capacity 1, and have been well-studied since then [2, 10, 11, 9, 4, 12] . A linear-time algorithm to compute a maximum cardinality popular matching in an HR instance is given in [3] and [14] with different notions of popularity. Furthermore, for the SM and HR problem, it is known that a matching that is popular amongst the maximum cardinality matchings exists and can be computed in O(mn) time [11, 14] . The reductions in our paper are inspired by the work of [3, 4, 11, 14] . In all these earlier works, the main idea is to execute Gale and Shapley algorithm on the HR instance and then allow unmatched residents to propose with increased priority [11] certain number of times. As mentioned in [11] , this idea was first proposed in [13] . The HRLQ problem has been recently considered in [1] and [8] in different settings.
Notion of Popularity
The notion of popularity uses votes from vertices to compare two matchings. For r ∈ R, and any matching M in G, if r is unmatched in M then, M (r) = ⊥. A vertex prefers any of its neighbours over ⊥. For a vertex u ∈ R ∪ H, let x, y ∈ N (u) ∪ {⊥}, where N (u) denotes the neighbours of u in G. We define vote u (x, y) = 1 if u prefers x over y, −1 if u prefers y over x and 0 if x = y. Given two matchings M 1 and M 2 in the instance, for a resident r ∈ R, we define vote
Voting for a hospital:
A hospital h is assigned q + (h)-many votes to compare two matchings M 1 and M 2 ; this can be viewed as one vote per position of the hospital. If a position is not filled in a matching, we put a ⊥ there, so that |M 1 (h)| = |M 2 (h)| = q + (h). In our voting scheme, the hospital h is indifferent between M 1 and M 2 as far as its
To compare between the two sets of residents M 1 (h)\M 2 (h) and M 2 (h)\M 1 (h), a hospital can decide any pairing of the elements of these two sets. We denote this correspondence by corr h . Under this correspondence, for a resident
We can now define popularity.
There are several ways for a hospital to define the corr function. For example, a hospital h may decide to order and compare the two sets in the decreasing order of preferences (as in [14] or in the most adversarial order (as in [3] ). That is, the order due to which h gives the least votes to M 1 when comparing it with M 2 . We believe that our definition offers flexibility to hospitals to compare residents in M 1 (h) \ M 2 (h) and M 2 (h) \ M 1 (h) according to their custom designed criteria. Decomposing M ⊕ M : In the one-to-one setting, where M ⊕ M for any two matchings M and M is a collection of vertex-disjoint paths and cycles. Our setting is many-to-one and hence M ⊕ M has a more complex structure. Here, we recall a simple algorithm to decompose edges of M ⊕ M into (possibly non-simple) alternating paths and cycles from [14] . Consider the graphG = (R ∪ H, M ⊕ M ), for any two feasible matchings of the HRLQ instance. We note that the degree of every resident inG is at most 2 and the degree of every hospital inG is at most 2 · q + (h). Consider any connected component C ofG and let e ∈ M be any edge in C. We show how to construct a unique maximal M -alternating path or cycle ρ containing e: Start with ρ = e . Use the following inductive procedure. 1. Let r ∈ R be one end-point of ρ, and let (r, M (r)) ∈ ρ. We grow ρ by adding the edge (r, M (r)). Similarly if (r, M (r)) ∈ ρ, add (r, M (r)) to ρ. 2. Let h ∈ H be an end-point of ρ, and let the last edge (r, h) on ρ be in M \ M . We extend ρ by adding corr h (r, M, M ) if is not equal to ⊥. A similar step is performed if the last edge on ρ is (r, h) ∈ M \ M . 3. We stop the procedure when we complete a cycle (ensuring that the two adjacent residents of a hospital are corr for each other according to the hospital), or the path can no longer be extended. Otherwise we go to Step 1 or Step 2 as applicable and repeat.
Labels on edges:
While comparing a matching M 1 with another matching M 2 , the voting scheme induces a label on edges of M 2 with respect to
Reduction to HR problem
In this section we present our reduction from an HRLQ instance G = (R ∪ H, E) to an HR instance G = (R ∪ H , E ). To compute a largest size feasible matching that is popular amongst all feasible matchings, we compute a stable matching M in G . We show that there is a natural map from any stable matching M in G to a feasible matching M in G.
Before we describe the reduction in detail, we provide some intuition. Our reduction simulates the following algorithm: Execute the hospital-proposing Gale-Shapley algorithm on G by disregarding lower quotas of all hospitals. Let M 0 be a matching obtained. If some hospitals are under-subscribed 1 in M 0 , they apply with increased priority to residents (in order of preference) and a new matching M 1 is obtained. If there are deficient hospitals in M 1 , they again apply with an even higher priority. This process is repeated until there is no deficient hospital. This is achieved by reducing G to an HR instance G described below:
We first describe the vertices in G . The set H : For each hospital h ∈ H we have copies h 0 , . . . , h −1 of h in H . Here = 2 + h∈H q − (h). We need to define the capacities 2 of all hospitals h ∈ H (recall G is an HR instance, so we do not have lower quotas for h ∈ H ). The hospitals in H and their capacities are as described below:
1 We say that a hospital is under-subscribed in a matching M if |M (h)| < q + (h) and is deficient if 2 We use the term capacity for the hospitals in an HR instance whereas the term quota for hospitals in an HRLQ instance. 
The set R : The set of residents R consists of the set R along with a set of dummy residents D h corresponding to every hospital h ∈ H. The set R and D h are as defined below:
The following observation captures the number of dummy residents corresponding to every hospital h ∈ H.
Observation 2. For a hospital h ∈ H, the total number of dummy residents corresponding
Preference lists:
We denote by list r and list h the preference lists of r and h in G respectively. Furthermore, D 
Hospitals' preference lists: Consider a hospital h
s ∈ H for s ∈ {1, . . . , − 2} and let q denote the capacity of h s . The preference list of h s is of the form: q-dummy residents of level-(s − 1), followed by preference list of h in G, followed by q dummy residents of level-s. For h 0 , the preference list is the preference list of h in G followed by capacity many dummy residents of level-0. Finally, for h −1 , there are dummy residents of level-( − 2) followed by
Residents' preference lists:
Properties of the stable matching M in G
With respect to a stable matching M in G we introduce the following definitions.
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Definition 3. Level-s resident: A non-dummy resident r ∈ R is said to be at level-s in M if r is matched to a level-s hospital in M . Let R s denote the set of level-s residents.
Definition 4. Active hospital: A hospital h
s is said to be active in M if M (h s ) contains at least one non-dummy resident. Otherwise, (when all positions of h s are matched to dummy residents), h s is said to be inactive.
In the following lemma, we state some invariants for any stable matching M in G (see Appendix ?? for proof). These invariants allow us to define a natural map from M to a matching M in G, and to show that M is feasible as well as popular among feasible matchings.
Lemma 5. The following hold for any stable matching M in G :

For any h ∈ H, M matches at most q + (h) non-dummy residents across all its level copies in G .
The matching M in G leaves only the level-( − 1) copy of any hospital (if it exists)
under-subscribed.
inactive in M and all positions of h j are matched to dummy residents of level-(j − 1).
For any h ∈ H, at most two consecutive level copies h
s and h s+1 are active in M .
A level-s resident r in M does not have any hospital h in its preference list which is active at level-(s + 2) or more in M .
Proof.
Proof of 1:
Consider the set of dummy residents corresponding to a hospital h ∈ H i.e. 
4
Maximum cardinality popular matching
In this section, we show how to use the reduction in the previous section to compute a maximum cardinality matching that is popular amongst all feasible matchings.. Thus, amongst all feasible matchings, our algorithm outputs the largest popular matching. We call such a matching a maximum cardinality popular matching. Our algorithm reduces the HRLQ instance G to an HR instance G as described in Section 3. We then compute a stable matching M in G . Finally, to obtain a matching M in G we describe a simple map function. For every
Note that M (h) denotes the set of non-dummy residents matched to any copy h s of h in M . Thus, a resident r is matched to a hospital h in M if and only if r is matched to a level-s copy of h in M for some s ∈ {0, . . . , − 1}. We say that M = map(M ). We now show some useful invariants about the matching M = map(M ). Division of R and H into subsets: We divide the residents and hospitals in G into subsets depending upon a matching M in G . Let R i be the set of non-dummy residents matched to a level-i hospital h i in M . We define the same set R i in G as well. Further, define H j to be the set of hospitals h ∈ H such that R ∩ M (h j ) = ∅, that is, level-j copy h j of h is matched to at least one non-dummy resident in M . Define the unmatched residents to be in R 0 . Also, a non-lower-quota hospital h such that M (h) = ∅ is defined to be in H 1 , and a lower-quota hospital h with M (h) = ∅ is defined to be in H −1 . The following lemma summarizes the properties of the sets R i and H j . 
Proof of 5:
Let there be an edge (r, h) in G such that h is a non-lower-quota hospital undersubscribed in M , and let r ∈ R 0 . By part 3 above, h ∈ H 1 .
If r is unmatched in M and hence in M , then (r, h 0 ) blocks M . This is because, since h 1 is active in M implies that M (h 0 ) must contain a dummy resident in D 
Proof of 6:
For the sake of contradiction, assume that h ∈ H s for s ≥ 2 and still 
Throughout the following discussion, assume that M is a matching which is a map of a stable matching M in G and N is any feasible matching in G. We prove below that M is in fact feasible in G.
Theorem 7. If G admits a feasible matching, then M = map(M ) is feasible for G.
Proof. Suppose M is not feasible. Thus, there is a deficient lower-quota hospital h in M . Let N be a feasible matching in G. Consider decomposition of M ⊕ N into (possibly nonsimple) paths and cycles as described in Section 2. As h is deficient in M and not deficient in N , there must be a path ρ in M ⊕ N ending in h. Moreover, if the other end of ρ is a hospital h then |M (h )| − |N (h )| > 0. Note that in this case, ρ has even-length and hence ends with a M -edge. The other case is where ρ ends in a resident r and hence ends with a N -edge. We consider the two cases below:
ρ ends in a hospital h : As h is deficient in M , h ∈ H −1 by part 4 of Lemma 6. Also, since |M (h )| > |N (h )| ≥ q − (h ), by part 6 of Lemma 6, h ∈ H 0 ∪ H 1 . Thus ρ starts at H −1 and ends in H 0 or H 1 . Let ρ = h, r 1 , h 1 , r 2 , h 2 , . . . , r t , h t , r , h , where (r i , h i ) ∈ M and (r , h ) ∈ M . We show below that such a path ρ can not exist and hence M must be feasible. By part 5 of Lemma 6, h has edges only to residents in R −1 . Hence r 1 ∈ R −1 and hence h 1 ∈ H −1 . By part 2 of Lemma 6, h 1 has no edges to residents in R 0 ∪ . . . ∪ R −3 .
Therefore r 2 ∈ R −1 ∪ R −2 and h 2 ∈ H −1 ∪ H −2 . Thus each h i ∈ ρ can not be in H j , for any j < −i. But h ∈ H 0 ∪H 1 and hence r ∈ R 0 ∪R 1 . Therefore h t / ∈ H 3 ∪. . .∪H −1 by part 2 of Lemma 6, otherwise (h t , r ) edge can not exist in G. In other words, ρ has to contain at least one hospital from each level i, 1 ≤ i ≤ − 1. Thus t ≥ − 2. Moreover, all the hospitals in ρ which are in H −1 ∪ . . . ∪ H 2 are lower-quota hospitals. Thus ρ has at least t + 1 = − 1 lower-quota hospitals. Note that this count includes repetitions, as a hospital can appear multiple times in ρ. However, any hospital in H 2 ∪ . . . ∪ H −1 can not be matched to more than q − (h) residents in M by part 6 and hence can appear at most q − (h) times on ρ. But then the sum of lower quotas of all the hospitals is − 2, contradicting that ρ has a total of − 1 occurrences of lower-quota hospitals. Thus such a path ρ can not exist and M must be feasible. ρ ends in a resident r: Now consider the case where ρ ends at a resident r. Then the last edge on ρ must be a N -edge and hence r is unmatched in M . Therefore r ∈ R 0 .  Let ρ = h, r 1 , h 1 , r 2 , h 2 , . . . , r t , h t , r where (r i , h i ) ∈ M for 1 ≤ i ≤ t and the remaining edges are in N . Consider the first hospital, say h j on ρ such that h j ∈ H 2 and for each
Such an h j has to exist by the argument given for the previous case. Moreover, j ≥ − 2 as ρ has to contain at least one hospital from each level as described in the previous case. Thus the number of occurrences of lower-quota hospitals on ρ exceeds the sum of lower quotas and hence such a ρ can not exist. This completes the proof of the lemma.
In Lemma 8 and Theorem 9 below, we give crucial properties of the division of R and H that will be helpful in proving popularity of the matching M which is a map of a stable matching M in G .
Lemma 8.
Let N be any feasible matching. Let (r, h) ∈ M and (r , h) ∈ N such that r =corr h (r, M, N ). Further let h ∈ H j ∩ H j+1 and r ∈ R j+1 . Further, let r ∈ R j . Then the label on (r , h) edge is (−1, −1).
Proof.
Clearly r is not matched to h in M , as corr(r) is picked only from M (h) ⊕ M (h) and r ∈ M (h). Let r ∈ M (h ). Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that (r , h) does not have (−1, −1) label. Consider the same edge in G . In G , this is an edge between a j-level resident and a j + 1-level hospital. The label on (r , h) in G can not be (×, 1), as this cause the label on the (r , h j+1 ) edge in G to be (1, 1) . This is because, if h prefers r over r in G, the preference remains same in G as well. On the other hand, r prefers any j + 1-level hospital over any j-level hospital, and hence h j+1 over h j . So it must be the case that the label on (r , h) in G must be (1, −1). But in this case, in G , h j is matched to one of its last dummies since h j+1 is active. Thus (r , h j ) forms a blocking pair with respect to M in G . This proves that the label on (r , h) in G must be (−1, −1).
Let ρ be a path in M ⊕N where M is the map of a stable matching M in G and N is any feasible matching in G. Here ρ is constructed according to the decomposition described in Section 2. Furthermore, the labels on edges of N \ M are assigned as described in Section 2. = h 0 , r 1 , h 1 , r 2 , h 2 , . . . , h t , r t+1 . Moreover, let h 0 ∈ H p ∩ H p+1 and r t+1 ∈ R q . Then the number of (1, 1) edges in ρ is at most the number of (−1, −1)
Theorem 9. Let ρ
Proof. We prove this by induction on the number of (−1, −1) edges. Note that, except h 0 , all the h i s are matched in M , and hence we can consider them at the same level as their matched residents.
by feasibility of N . Therefore h t ∈ H 0 ∪ H 1 by part 6 of Lemma 6 which implies that r t ∈ R 0 ∪ R 1 . Consider the subpath ρ = ρ \ {(r 0 , h 0 ), (r t , h t )}. Thus ρ begins at h 0 and ends at r t . Applying Theorem 9 with q = 1 and 0 ≤ p ≤ gives that the number of (1, 1) edges on ρ , and hence on ρ, is at most one more than the number of (−1, −1) edges on ρ. These votes in favor of N are compensated by the end-points r 0 and h t as r 0 is unmatched in N and |M (h t )| > |N (h t )|. This completes the proof of the theorem.
The following lemma proves that M is a maximum cardinality popular matching in G.
Lemma 11. For any feasible matching
Proof. Consider M ⊕ N . There is an alternating path ρ in M ⊕ N such that ρ has both the end-points unmatched in M . Let ρ = h 0 , r 1 , h 1 , . . . , r t , h t , r t+1 where (r i , h i ) ∈ M for each i. As h 0 is under-subscribed in M , and r t+1 is unmatched in M , by the definition of levels and Invariant 3, h 0 ∈ H 1 and r t+1 ∈ R 0 . Further, by Invariant 4, there is no edge from h 0 to any r ∈ R 0 and no edge from r t+1 to any h ∈ H 1 ∪ . . . ∪ .Add this to the invariants, and of course, prove the invariants!! The path ρ begins in H 1 and has to end in R 0 , and the only edges to R 0 are from vertices in H 0 ∪ H 1 . Further, each r i , i ≤ t is matched in M and hence the corresponding hospital h i is at the same level as r i . By Invariant 2, if h i ∈ H 2 ∪. . .∪H −1 then r i+1 / ∈ R 0 for any i. Therefore there must be an edge (h i , r i+1 ) on ρ such that h i ∈ H 1 and r i ∈ R 0 and 1 ≤ i ≤ t − 1. By Lemma 8, this edge must be labelled (−1, −1). Now consider the two subpaths ρ 1 = h 0 , r 1 , h 1 , . . . , r i and ρ 2 = h i+1 , r i+2 , . . . , h t , r t+1 . These are the subpaths obtained by removing the subpath r i , h i , r i+1 , h i+1 from ρ. By assumption, h i ∈ H 1 and r i+1 ∈ R 0 , hence r i ∈ R 1 and h i+1 ∈ H 0 . Therefore, applying Theorem 9 to ρ 1 and ρ 2 gives that the number of (1, 1) edges on ρ 1 and ρ 2 are at most the number of (−1, −1) edges on them. Thus N does not get more votes than M on ρ 1 or ρ 2 . Further, M gets two more votes on the (h i , r i+1 ) edge. Hence the lemma follows.
Popular matching amongst maximum cardinality feasible matchings
In this section, we modify the reduction in Section 3 to obtain a matching that is popular amongst all the maximum cardinality feasible matchings of the HRLQ instance. The reduction is very similar to the one described in Section 3 except for the number of copies of each hospital. The HR instance G described in Section 3, has = 2 + h∈H q − (h) copies corresponding to each hospital in G.
Reduction to HR instance
Given HRLQ instance G = (R ∪ H, E), the corresponding HR instance G = (R ∪ H , E ) is as follows. We set = |R| + h∈H q − (h). We start with the vertices in G . The set H : For every hospital h ∈ H, we have copies of h in H . The set H and the capacities are as given below.
The following observation is immediate.
Observation 1. For a hospital h ∈ H, the sum of capacities of all level copies of h in G is
The set R : The set of residents R consists of the set R along with a set of dummy residents D h corresponding to every hospital h ∈ H. The set R and D h are as defined below: Observation 2. For a hospital h ∈ H, the total number of dummy residents corresponding
Preference lists: Recall that the preference list of a resident r in G is denoted by list r and that of a hospital h is list h .
Hospitals' preference lists:
For h s ∈ H :
The following lemma summarizes properties of a stable matching M in G . It is an analogue of Lemma 5 from Section 3. The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 5; we omit it here. 
Popularity of the matching
In order to compute a matching that popular amongst all the maximum cardinality feasible matchings, we execute the following algorithm. Construct the graph G and compute a stable matching M in G . Because of the invariants on M , there exists a natural map from
is popular amongst all maximum cardinality feasible matchings in G. Division of residents and hospitals into subsets: As in Section 4, we divide residents and hospitals into subsets based on a stable matching M in G . Thus R i is the set of nondummy residents matched to a level-i hospital h i in M , H i is the set of hospitals that are active at level-i in M , unmatched residents are in R 0 . Also, if M (h) = ∅ then h ∈ H (|R|−1) if q − (h) = 0 and h ∈ H −1 if q − (h) > 0. The following lemma summarizes the properties of a matching M in G where M = map(M ) and M is a stable matching in G . Proof. The proof is analogous to that of Theorem 7. Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that M is not feasible and hence there is a hospital h such that |M (h)| < q − (h). We need to consider M ⊕ N where N is a feasible matching in G. As N is feasible, |N (h)| ≥ q − (h) and hence there must be a path ρ in the decomposition of M ⊕ N with h as one of its end-points. The first case is that the other end-point of ρ is a hospital h and hence the last edge of ρ must be a M -edge (call this Case 1). In the second case, the other end-point of ρ is a a resident r, implying last edge of ρ is a N -edge (call this Case 2).
Lemma 13. Let M be a matching in G such that M = map(M ) and
Consider Case 1. As the path ends at h with an M -edge, |M (h )| > |N (h )| ≥ q − (h ). Then, by part 6 of Lemma 13, h ∈ H 0 ∪ . . . ∪ H (|R|−1) . Also, by part 4 of Lemma 13, h ∈ H ( −1) . Then, by a similar argument as in the proof of Theorem 7, the length of ρ exceeds the sum of lower-quotas of all the hospitals and hence such a path can not exist.
When ρ ends in a resident r, and hence the last edge is a N -edge, r is unmatched in M and hence must be in R 0 . A similar argument applies in this case as well, for the sub-path by the definition of levels. Consider the subpath ρ = ρ \ {(r t , h t )} i.e. the path obtained by removing the edge (r t , h t ) from ρ. Applying Theorem 16 to ρ with p ≥ |R| − 1 and q ≤ |R| − 1, we get that the number of (1, 1) edges on ρ is at most the number of (−1, −1) edges on ρ .
Consider the case when both the end-points of ρ are residents. Thus ρ = r 0 , h 1 , r 1 , . . . , h t , r t where (h i , r i ) ∈ M for all i. Again consider ρ = ρ \ {(h t , r t )}. As r 0 is unmatched in M , r 0 ∈ R 0 by the definition of levels. Applying Theorem 16 to ρ with q = 0, we get that the number of (1, 1) edges on ρ is at most the number of (−1, −1) edges on ρ .
